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Abstract
This paper provides a test of e¢ciency of consumption decisions in households with many
decision-makers. It also presents a method of determining the number of these decision-makers.
Information on some distribution factors is needed to implement this approach.
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1 Introduction
Much e¤ort has recently been put into the search for ways of empirically testing so-called
“collective rationality”, according to which intra-household decisions are Pareto-e¢cient (e.g., Chi-
appori 1992, Browning et al. 1994, Udry 1996 and Fortin and Lacroix 1997). Even in a very general
setting allowing for private commodities and consumption externalities, Browning and Chiappori
(1998, hereafter BC) have shown that Pareto-e¢ciency may impose testable restrictions on con-
sumption behavior. When there are two potential decision-makers in the household, they show that
the (Pseudo-)Slutsky matrix is the sum of a symmetric negative semi-de…nite matrix and a matrix
that has, at most, rank one. They also show how this condition can be generalized to the case
of a household with more than two decision-makers. This extension is important since it is likely
that in many households adult children who live with their parents in‡uence the family decision
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1process. Moreover, polygamous or extended families are quite common in many developing coun-
tries. As a by-product of their analysis, BC also provide a simple test which allows the number of
decision-makers in a multi-person household to be determined.
These tests face two limitations, however. First, they cannot be performed when only cross-
sectional data (with no observed variability in regional prices) are available. Second, from BC
results, it is easy to show that these tests cannot be implemented when the number of observed
commodities is less than two times the number of intra-household decision-makers. In this case, the
symmetry plus rank restrictions are always satis…ed. This means, for instance, that they have no
implication on the standard labor supply model with one Hicksian consumption good, two leisure
commodities and two decision makers.
Fortunately, a complementary approach, based on so-called distribution factors (see Browning
et al. 1994), provides tests that are less subject to these limitations. These tests can be imple-
mented with cross-sectional data and, as shown below, only require having a number of observed
commodities larger than the number of intra-household decision-makers. A distribution factor is
a variable that in‡uences the decision process within the household, but which doesn’t in‡uence
preferences or the household budget set. In the recent literature, the share of exogenous income
under the control of one household member (e.g., Browning et al. 1994) and the state of the mar-
riage market, as proxied for instance by the sex ratio (Chiappori et al. 1998), have been used as
distribution factors.1
In the case of a household where decision-makers are limited to two, Bourguignon et al. (1995)
have shown that the restrictions imposed by distribution factors stem from the fact that they
in‡uence consumption choices only through their e¤ect on the relative weight of one individual
in the household utility function. However, for each additional individual involved in the decision
process there is an associated relative weight. Therefore, the one-dimensional e¤ect of distribution
factors is lost, so that their result does not extend trivially to the case of multi-person households.
This paper generalizes the distribution factors test to households where there are potentially more
than two persons who participate in the decision process. It also provides a simple method of
determining the number of decision-makers when the intra-household consumption decisions process
is e¢cient.
1An important class of distribution factors are the «extra-environmental parameters» (EEPs) discussed by McEl-
roy (1990).
22 The Theoretical Framework
The convention used throughout this note is to denote vectors and matrices using letters in
boldface. Also, the expression Dzf(z) denotes the partial derivatives matrix of any vector-valued
di¤erentiable function f(z) with respect to z, whose mnth entry is @fm(z)=@zn.
Let’s consider a household with I+1 members participating in the decision process (with I > 1).
Each draws his/her well-being from the consumption of N market commodities, which can take
a private form, a public form or both (e.g., part of home electricity consumption can be used to
heat each household adult’s home o¢ce and part can be used to heat the common rooms). De…ne
x ´ [x1;x2;:::;xN]0 as the N-vector representing household consumption. All prices are normalized
to one. The household budget constraint is therefore given by: ¶0x = m, where ¶ is a unity vector of
dimension N while m holds for the level of household income.2 Each member i, for i = 1;:::;I +1,
has preferences given by a strongly concave and twice continuously di¤erentiable utility function
Ui(x).
Axiom 1 The outcomes of the decision process are (weakly) Pareto-e¢cient.
Axiom 2 The decision process depends on a set of K variables y ´ [y1;y2;:::;yK]0 which are inde-
pendent of individual preferences and which do not a¤ect the overall household budget constraint.




¹I(m;y)0 UI(x) +UI+1(x) (P)
subjectto ¶0x = m;
where ¹I(m;y): RK+1 ! RI
++ and UI(x): RN ! RI. Thus the household utility function to be
maximized in this program is a weighted sum of the decision-makers’ utility functions, with the
vector ¹I(m;y) holding for the relative utility weights of the I …rst decision-makers with respect
to the I + 1 th’s participant.3 One important characteristic of this collective approach is that the
I relative utility weights are not constant in general, but are functions of the overall household
income and of the distribution factors y.
The demand system under collective rationality, as obtained from solving the program (P) for x;
can be written as: x = ^ x(m; ¹I(m;y)). This system shows that the distribution factors in‡uence
household consumption choices only through the I relative utility weights entering the household
2This assumes that the household does not produce any of these N goods, or if not, that the markets for these
goods are perfect.
3These weights could also be interpreted as the Lagrangean multipliers associated with the inegality constraints
in the program: Maxfx 2RN
+gUI+1(x) subjectto UI(x) ¸ vI(m; y) and ¶
0x = m, where vI(m; y): R
K+1 ! R
I .
3utility function. This is a consequence of the fact that the distribution factors do not a¤ect the
Paretian frontier (which depends only on preferences and the household budget constraint) but
only the point chosen by the household on this frontier. The basic issue therefore, is to …nd a way
to test whether the household demand system can be written as ^ x(m; ¹I(m;y)). The problem is
that this function is unobservable since the relative utility weights are unobservable. Rather, what
is actually observed is the function e x(m;y) which must satisfy:
e x(m;y) = ^ x(m; ¹I(m;y)) (1)
and adding-up: ¶0e x(m;y) = m: In order to keep the presentation as simple as possible, we shall
drop m from all functions for the remaining of the paper. Thus (1) becomes:
e x(y) = ^ x(¹I(y)): (2)
Now, based on a particular type of conditional demand system generalizing the approach suggested
by Bourguignon et al., it is possible to derive a (local) test of collective rationality. We shall
consider partitions x = [x
0
1;x0
2]0 of the demand system and y = [y
0
1;y0
2]0 of the distribution factors,
with x1and y1having the same dimension k. Given such a partition, (2) can be written as:
x1 = e x1(y1;y2) = ^ x1(¹I(y1;y2)); (3)
x2 = e x2(y1;y2) = ^ x2(¹I(y1;y2)): (4)
Lemma 1 Let N ¸ I +1 and K ¸ I + 1 and consider a y¤ 2 RK at which e x(y) is di¤erentiable.
Next, consider partitions of x and y such that Dy1e x1(y¤) is non-singular and let x¤
1 = e x1(y¤
1;y¤
2):
Then, there exists a neighborhood V(y¤
2;x¤





1 = e x1(e y1(x¤
1;y2);y2) = ^ x1(¹I(e y1(x¤
1;y2);y2)) 8 y2 2 V(y¤
2;x¤
1): (5)
Proof. Use the implicit function theorem.
Under the conditions of Lemma 1, one can de…ne the function x2 : RK¡k ! RN¡k by:
x2(x¤
1;y2) = ^ x2(¹I(e y1(x¤
1;y2);y2)): (6)
The following theorem now generalizes a result by Bourguignon et al.:
4Theorem 1 Let the conditions of Lemma 1 hold and suppose that, in addition, ¹I(y) and ^ x(y)




2) = 0; (7)
where 0 is a null matrix of dimension (N ¡I)£ (K ¡I):
Proof. Taking the derivatives of (5) and (6) with respect to y2 at y¤










2) = D¹I^ x2(¹I(y¤))[Dy1¹I(y¤)Dy2e y1(x¤
1;y¤
2) +Dy2¹I(y¤)]:
Now consider the system of I equations in I variables D¹I^ x1(¹I(y¤))z = 0: For Dy1e x1 (y¤) to be
non-singular, it is necessary that D¹I^ x1(¹I(y¤)) be also non-singular. Thus, the only solution of
this system is z = 0; from which we obtain [Dy1¹I(y¤)Dy2e y1(x¤
1;y¤




The intuition behind this result is that demands for the N ¡ I commodities, as given by
x2(x¤
1;y¤
2), are conditioned on as many commodities as there are relative utility weights in the
household utility function (that is, I). Therefore, adjustments in y1 will compensate for any change
in y2 so as to keep x1 constant in a way that will leave the I relative utility weights unchanged.
However, if ¹I stays constant when y2 changes, then x2 must also stay constant, and therefore
Dy2x2(x¤
1;y¤
2) = 0. Note that when N = I +1, one has x2(x¤
1;y¤
2) = m ¡¶0x¤
1 from the adding-up
constraint. Therefore, (7) is always satis…ed in this case. This implies that N > I + 1 is required
to provide a test of the collective setting.
Corollary 1 Assume that the preferences of the decision-makers all di¤er. Then, under the condi-
tions of Lemma 1, the number of decision-makers in the household is given by the smallest number
of goods under which demand functions must be conditioned in order to satisfy restrictions (7), plus
one.
Assuming that conditions of Lemma 1 apply to all observed y and with due account of preference
variables and household income, (7) provides a (local) test of collective rationality. Furthermore,
under collective rationality, Corollary 1 gives a method of determining the number of actual decision-
makers within the household.
53 Econometric Considerations
In practice, econometricians only observe Ko (6 K) distribution factors and No (6 N) com-
modities. It is possible to verify whether some restrictions imposed by collective rationality are
satis…ed, only if Ko > I +1 and No > I +1 for No < N or No > I +1 for No = N. Before testing
collective rationality, one must check that each of the Ko variables signi…cantly a¤ects each of the
No unconditional demands, which is required for these variables to be distribution factors. With
regards to the test itself, the choice of the elements of x1 on which the demand sub-system is con-
ditioned should not in‡uence the result.4 Furthermore, note that the estimation of this conditional
sub-system raises an identi…cation issue even when y and m are exogenous, since the x1 variables
are endogenous. However, since the number of exogenous variables excluded (that is, the number
of elements in vector y1) is equal to the number of right-hand side endogenous variables included
(= I), the order criterion for exact identi…cation in a linear model is satis…ed. Finally, one problem
with the test proposed is that it requires one more observable distribution factor for each additional
decision-maker, which may appear quite demanding. However, this may not be a limitation as long
as each of the I decision makers’ share of total household income can be considered as a distribution
factor. Econometric work to implement this test using household data from Burkina Faso (where
polygamous families are quite frequent) is currently ongoing.
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